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Reference: Cunningham, B. (1999) How do I come to know my spirituality as I create my own living 
educational theory. Ph.D Thesis, University of Bath. Retrieved 21 January 2007 from 
http://people/bath.ac.uk/edsajw/benword/bapp.pdf 
Action Research: ‘How do I improve what I am doing?’ 
 
 
In what is not intended to be an exhaustive account, I summarise below some of 
what I’ve learnt about the historical roots of action research. In the account I also 
offer my understanding of my form of action research as it evolved in answer to my 
enquiry question, “How do I come to know my spirituality, as I create my own living 
educational theory?”      
   
 
Stephen Corey 
 
Stephen Corey (1953) first spoke of action research as being a means for improving 
practice in school. He urged teachers to research their own practice in order to 
improve it. Prior to that the only researchers were the 'expert' outsiders who 
'objectively' researched social situations. But Corey wanted teachers to research their 
own practices scientifically so that they could evaluate their decisions and actions, 
modify and reformulate their plans. And so the cycle would proceed. Corey insisted 
on teachers' research being a cooperative activity which would support democratic 
values. 
 
 
Kurt Lewin 
 
Kurt Lewin (1946) is reputed to have been the first to use the term 'action research', 
as a way of describing professional development in social situations. It was only 
later applied to what teacher-researchers were actually doing. Lewin’s conception of 
action research is different, however, to how many teacher researchers would see it 
today. Hopkins explains (1985: 54) the difference thus: 
 
.... Lewin's conception of action research is very different from what goes on 
in the name of teacher research. Lewin's concept of action research was (i) 
as an externally initiated intervention designed to assist a client system, (ii) 
functionalist in orientation, and (iii) prescriptive in practice. None of these 
features apply to what I assume to be the nature of classroom research by 
teachers which is characterized by its practitioner, problem solving, and 
eclectic orientation.  
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Hopkins (ibid) also points to the fact that the functionalist values appearing in 
Lewin's writing contrast with his commitment to democracy and communitarian 
values. 
 
Lewin's form of action research was externally initiated and so differed from our 
current conception of the personally initiated form of action research by teachers. 
However, the cycle of reconnaissance, planning, action and observation favoured by 
Lewin forms the essential basis of current action research. 
 
 
Lawrence Stenhouse 
 
Lawrence Stenhouse (1975: 144) was the first researcher in Britain to advocate and 
work towards enabling teachers to take an active role in teacher research. Rather 
than implementing outsider researcher's ideas in their teaching, he wanted teachers 
to research their own practice. As he said, “It is not enough that teachers' work 
should be studied, they need to study it themselves.” Furthermore, he advocated, 
 
The commitment to systematic questioning of one's own teaching as a basis 
for development;  
The commitment and the skills to study one's own teaching; 
The concern to question and to test theory in practice by the use of those 
skills. 
 
Stenhouse (1983:163) also wanted the student, the teacher and the school to 
experience emancipation: 
 
My theme is an old-fashioned one - emancipation .... The essence of 
emancipation as I conceive it is intellectual, moral and spiritual autonomy 
which we recognise when we eschew paternalism and the role of authority 
and hold ourselves obliged to appeal to judgment.     
 
The intellectual, moral and spiritual autonomy involved in emancipation could 
enable teachers and others to be self-determining, to be self-authoring. They could 
take at least some responsibility for themselves and their actions. 
 
Stenhouse (1983: 163) wanted the student to be able to stand outside the teacher's 
authority and to be able to discover and own knowledge for him/herself. He wanted 
teachers, by adopting a research stance, to escape from the control situation they so 
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often found themselves in. He wanted teachers to critically assess their situation. By 
so doing they would be engaged in meaningful professional development and 
become more autonomous in their judgments on their own practice.  
 
Stenhouse was interested in the school, as institution, also  experiencing 
emancipation. The 'autonomous' and 'creative' school could adapt external changes 
for internal purposes. It need not be a slave to external pressures. Successful internal 
change would involve the teacher in successful internal learning.  
 
In Stenhouse's conception of action research, however, external observers still 
monitored the practice of the teacher. Teachers didn’t have the responsibility to 
explain their own practice unaided for themselves. Full-time researchers  still 
supported teachers' work (1975: 162), and the supporters were still the 'experts'. 
 
 
John Elliott and Clem Adelman 
  
John Elliott, another prominent action researcher, is also the preeminent curricularist 
(McKernan, 1991: 22-23). It was in and through the concept of curriculum that 
Elliott’s (1978a) first complete analysis of action research took place, it is 
entitled,“What is action research in schools?” In this analysis Elliott insists “that 
teaching is inescapably a theoretical activity.” The task of the teacher is to interpret 
their everyday practice in the pursuit of reflective self-development. Elliott wanted 
the teacher to reunify theory and practice. The curriculum development movement 
spearheaded by Stenhouse, and afterwards by Elliott, helped to revivify action 
research. Elliott (1991a: 69), in defining what he meant by action research, said it 
was an attempt to improve the quality of life in a social situation, thus, 
 
Action-research might be defined as “the study of a social situation with a 
view to improving the quality of action within it.” It aims to feed practical 
judgment in concrete situations, and the validity of the 'theories' or 
hypotheses it generates depends not so much on 'scientific' tests of truth, as 
on their usefulness in helping people to act more intelligently and skilfully. 
In action-research 'theories' are not validated independently and then 
applied to practice. They are validated through practice.  
 
Central to Elliott’s (1987: 157) analysis is the idea that the action researcher 
develops a personal interpretive understanding from working on practical problems, 
and that practical action and discourse constitutes the theoretical understanding to be 
obtained. For Elliott, educational action research is a moral endeavour because it 
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seeks to realise values in practice. It seeks to have teacher-researchers, rather than 
the academic disciplines, declared to be the main contributors to educational 
research.  
 
Working with Adelman, Elliott (1973) wanted teachers to be collaborators rather 
than observers in order 
 
To help teachers already attempting to implement Inquiry/Discovery 
methods, but aware of a gap between attempt and achievement, to narrow 
this gap in their situation; to help teachers by fostering an action-research 
orientation towards classroom practice.  
 
Elliott and Adelman (1976) supported a small group of teachers to research their 
practice in implementing and developing a pedagogy of enquiry learning. It was 
during this project that both Elliott and Adelman described the procedure of 
'triangulation' as follows: 
 
Triangulation involves gathering accounts of a teaching situation from three 
different points of view; namely, those of the teachers, his pupils, and a 
participant observer .... By comparing his own account with accounts from 
the other two standpoints a person at one point of the triangle has an 
opportunity to test and perhaps revise it on the basis of more sufficient data.  
 
Elliott considered curriculum and teaching to be theoretical enterprises and research 
itself to be a self-reflective process in which teachers examined their own theoretical 
world of practice. 
 
 
The hermeneutic/Interpretive tradition 
 
Let me recall again Elliott’s strongly articulated view about his research interest, 
which is “the idea that the action researcher develops a personal interpretive 
understanding”. It is with the interpretive tradition, and with Elliott’s notion of  “a 
personal interpretive understanding”  that I now want to deal. 
 
For Hitchcock and Hughes, (1989: 29) a major characteristics of interpretive 
research is to do with taking seriously 
 
the question of language and meaning and giving priority to first unravelling 
actors’ description of events and activities ....   
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The dictionary (Chambers Dictionary, 1979: 686) explanation of interpretation 
echoes that characteristic when it says:  
 
To interpret means to explain the meaning of, to elucidate, to unfold, show 
the purpose of: to translate into intelligible terms. 
 
Linked with interpretation is hermeneutics, which is described by the dictionary as 
the “science of interpretation” (p. 609). 
 
According to Hitchcock and Hughes (1989: 29), the researcher becomes involved 
and develops a “relationship with the subjects of the research.” This relationship 
leads to choosing a more directly participant form of observation, where the 
researcher observes individuals in their ordinary, everyday, natural social settings 
and records their accounts of what it was the individuals were doing (p. 32).  
 
Great care is taken to faithfully reconstruct the “actor’s” perspective and detailed 
description comes before explanation. The focus is placed upon the individual’s or 
actor’s accounts and experiences rather than on “an objective view through the eyes 
of an outside observer” (ibid). There isn’t a concern with generalisation but with 
“locating the subjects of the research in their own cultural and interactional context 
emphasising the need to understand the situation” (ibid). 
 
Interpretive research assumes that all human action is meaningful and therefore has 
to be interpreted and understood within the context of social practices. In fact, 
interpretive researchers stress the principle of intentionality. They stress that human 
action is for the most part deliberate; that people do not just react to situations and 
stimuli but reflect on their situation and act on this reflection, in a reflective way 
(Hitchcock and Hughes, 1989: 28).  
 
According to Scott and Usher (1996: 18),  
 
we need to understand the meanings that construct and are constructed by 
interactive human behaviour. 
 
They go on to say that: “Human action is given meaning by interpretive schemes or 
frameworks” (pp. 18-19),  
 
and that  
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both the subject (the researcher) and the object (other people) of research 
have the same characteristic of being interpreters or sense-seekers (ibid.  
 
Knowledge, in the interpretive framework, is relative to that framework, is not 
cumulative but perspective-bound and partial. Interpretation is in itself circular. The 
interpretation of part of something depends on interpreting the whole, but 
interpreting the whole depends on an interpretation of the parts  (Elliott, 1993: 18). 
And an important characteristic of the circularity of interpretation is that it always 
takes place against a background of assumptions and presuppositions, beliefs and 
practices (Scott and Usher: 1996: 19). This, Gadamer (1975: 173) calls ‘tradition.’ 
As with interpretation, so too with the researchers who make interpretations. They 
can’t be separated from the historical and cultural context that defines the 
interpretive framework (Scott and Usher: 1996: 19). Their interpretations will 
always takes place against a background of assumptions and presuppositions, beliefs 
and practices, of which the subjects and objects of research are never fully aware and 
which can never be fully specified.  
 
Because the researcher and researchee in interpretive understanding are both part of 
a background or ‘tradition’, this raises the question of whether the researcher as 
interpreter, as meaning producer, can be objective about the meanings produced by 
the researchee. Although continuing to recognise their situatedeness, researchers 
‘bracket’, that is, temporarily set aside, their own meanings, suspend their 
subjectivity, and assume the attitude of disinterested observers (pp. 21-22). Of 
course Gadamer argues (1975) that this isn’t entirely satisfactory because it’s 
impossible to escape our ‘pre- understandings’ even temporarily.  
 
Instead, it is useful for researchers to hold on to their interpretive frameworks or pre-
understandings and to allow interplay between this and the actions that they are 
trying to understand. It is in this way that knowledge is developed. So, in fact, 
researchers’ pre-understandings, far from being biases, actually make them more 
open-minded because as they are interpreting and understanding, their pre-
understandings are being put at risk, tested and modified through the interface 
between the pre-understandings and the actions that they are trying to understand. So 
rather than bracketing their ‘pre-understandings’, researchers should use them as the 
essential starting point for acquiring knowledge (Scott and Usher, 1996: 22).  
 
But what do researchers do about their perspective arising from their situatedness 
when they are connecting with the situatedness of the researched? According to 
Gadamer (in Scott and Usher, 1996: 22), there is a fusion or enlargement of the 
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understanding of both researcher and researchee which functions as an alternative to 
objectivity. The fusion is the outcome of intersubjective agreement where different 
and conflicting interpretations are harmonised. This happens not because of ‘right’ 
methods, but because of what Scott and Usher (1996: 24) call ‘right’ arguments, that 
is, propositional arguments. These ‘right’ arguments are subjected to the scrutiny of 
critical dialogue. Gadamer (ibid) believes that by comparing and contrasting various 
interpretations, a consensus can be achieved despite differences - indeed because of 
differences. The consensus, which is to be arrived at is subject to the social 
validation claims set down by Habermas (1976), according to which the form of 
communication of the researcher must be ‘undistorted’ in that it is accepted as being 
meaningful, true, justified and sincere by the validation group to whom the research 
is being presented. 
 
 
How best may I critique the hermeneutic/interpretive tradition?   
  
I wish to make some observations from the perspective of the form of action 
research I have created in my thesis - my own living educational theory.  For the 
sake of fairness and justice, however, I believe I should try and embody here - even 
if I fail - Marshall’s (1981: 399) heartfelt declaration that: “I appreciate other 
positions, and I feel that each has its own integrity and its own validity.”  Dadds 
(1993a: 231), too, views “theoretical contributions” as valuable, and this obviously 
includes the interpretive tradition. But how can I hold this tradition as being valuable 
and at the same time try to critique it respectfully? Let me see can I do so, as I 
follow Dadds’ lead “to seek to raise .... additional and complementary” ideas that 
“need not be adversarial, combative or hostile”, as Marshall puts it (1995: 331). In 
an attempt then to be both respectful and inclusive, let me say that, for me, the 
interpretive tradition, critical theory too, and other research theories are on a 
continuum in which living educational theory (Whitehead, 1993) is the latest and 
newest action research idea that specifically claims to be educational.  
 
Action research and my discussion about it is educational when I keep my “I” at the 
centre of both my action research enquiry and my discussion about it. Following 
McNiff (1988: 37), I believe that my “I” is my unassailable and inalienable integrity, 
and is a living, pro-active entity. Indeed, I acknowledged clearly in my thesis the 
force of my individual consciousness in my interpersonal relationships with teachers 
and others. It was a force that helped me to embody  my values, especially those of 
freedom and love, as I both formed and encouraged one-to-one interpersonal and 
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professional relationships with teachers and others in my action enquiries, as I 
created my own living educational theory as a form of improvisatory self-realisation. 
But let me show how I had to differ from the interpretive tradition, as I was creating 
my own living educational theory.  
 
The ‘truth’ claims I presented in my thesis (see Abstract) and at intervals to my Bath 
University validation group weren’t only to do with a process of argumentation, 
weren’t only  to do with showing “that the propositional content of what is being 
said is true” (Habermas, 1976). My educational claims were never only about 
“rational agreement reached through critical discussion” (Scott and Usher, 1996: 
23). Rather, I communicated my claims to educational knowledge through “a 
dialectical and dialogical form which is not amenable to systematic representation 
in a purely propositional form” (Whitehead, 1993: 114). ‘Right’ argument, “taking 
seriously the question of language and meaning” (Hitchcock and Hughes, 1989: 29), 
conceptual explanation and elucidation are all tools of propositional discourse, 
which by themselves couldn’t and didn’t help me to explain my own living 
educational theory. I explained my living educational theory within the form of 
intra-and inter-dialectical dialogues. The ‘intra’, meaning within, helped me to 
explain my meanings to myself, and the ‘inter’ meaning with others, helped me to 
explain my meanings to others.   
 
In creating my own living educational theory I don’t believe I treated educational 
knowledge as a controlled commodity (McNiff, 1988: 17-19). By that I mean that I 
never wished to control the teacher researchers I was supporting in a deterministic 
way by persuading them to fit themselves and their practices into pre-defined 
frameworks. Neither did I ever wish to be a participant observer and observe the 
teacher researchers I was supporting at work in their classrooms. If I did, I believe I 
would have had difficulty in maintaining an egalitarian stance, which is part of what 
I take the ‘participant’ in ‘participant observer’ to mean. I wanted the teacher 
researchers I supported to feel free to use their own tacit knowledge, trust their own 
judgments and create their own living educational theories. I wanted them to be able 
to understand the world from their own point of view (Polanyi, 1958: 327). I was 
available, however, to help them in whatever way they felt was helpful. Below, for 
example, is how I considered my role early in my educative relationship with John 
(chapter 3):  
 
I would have to wait to see what role would emerge for me in our educative 
relationship. Waiting and being willing to wait is a part of what I am now 
calling loving affirmation, albeit silent. 
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That didn’t mean, of course, that I never offered ideas to teacher researchers about 
how to move forward. I did, but I also wished to accept their right to accept or 
refuse. The value of freedom which I wished to embody in my relationship with 
them would be inauthentic unless the teacher researchers had choices between 
alternatives! So, even if I wanted to - and I didn’t - I believe there was no way in 
which my work with others could be classified as predictive. I worked at trying to 
keep open the various options a teacher researcher might take up. Neither did I want 
to limit the teacher researchers options by references to ‘pre-understandings’, 
‘situatedness’, or ‘tradition.’ If I had done so, the teacher researchers I was 
supporting mightn’t have had sufficient freedom - in my view - to ask questions of 
the kind, “How can I account for my educational development?”  
 
I was hoping of course that, in the process of my educative relationship with teacher 
researchers, they would consider the power of their “I” in questions of the kind, 
“How do I improve my practice?” In such questions they would discover, I believed, 
that their “I” existed as a living contradiction in holding values but experiencing 
their denial. Discovering their “I” to be a living contradiction, I felt, would motivate 
them to want to improve what they were doing. I believed also that the descriptions 
and explanations the teacher researchers created for their own learning, would 
constitute their own living educational theories (Whitehead, 1993). 
 
While I noticed in much of the literature that other teacher researcher supporters 
wrote up research on behalf of, or about, the work of the teacher researchers they 
were supporting, I have never wished to do so. If I wrote on behalf of others I would 
worry about whether I was being democratic and whether I was helping them to 
become, in my terms, “as free from fears as is humanly possible”? (section one, 
chapter 2) so that they could create their own living educational theories, as I was 
attempting to do for myself. I have to seriously ask myself, however, if that isn’t 
what I did - wrote up my research about others? 
   
I don’t believe I did so because I was not primarily interested in describing or 
observing the work of others “in their ordinary, everyday, natural settings,” and 
“recording” what they were doing (Hitchcock and Hughes, 1989: 29). Neither was I 
primarily interested in needing to “understand the situation” (ibid) in which the 
teacher researchers found themselves. I wasn’t primarily interested in giving 
meaning to “interactive human behaviour” (Scott and Usher, 1996: 18) by means of 
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“interpretive frameworks” (ibid). Neither did I primarily need linguistic meanings to 
what teacher researchers were doing. No, it was none of these! 
  
What I was primarily interested in was the encounter in my relationship with others. 
I considered the encounter, rather than educational intentions, to be educational in 
the sense that it offered me the opportunity to accept, affirm and confirm others so 
that they could feel free and become more confidently able to answer questions of 
the kind, “How do I improve what I am doing?” and “How do I live out my values in 
my practice?” (Whitehead, 1993). But was that the reality as I wrote up my various 
chapters in my thesis? I have to consider that now.  
 
I spoke at great length about my educative relationships with Marion, Valerie and 
Rose in chapter 2, later in this Appendix. I made reference also later in this 
Appendix to my ‘conflict’ in chapter 5, and spoke about the notions of ‘marginality’ 
and ‘inclusion’ (chapter 6)  in terms of the future job I intended taking up. I spoke at 
length later in this Appendix about the actual job I intended taking up and how well 
it fitted in with my values (chapter 7). I aim to speak below about my educative 
relationships with John in chapter 3 and David in chapter 4 and the values that I tried 
to embody in those relationships.  
 
In my educative relationship with John (chapter 3), I found he was very independent 
and tended to tell me what he was doing in his classroom to improve his practice. 
But I wanted to know what educative influence, if any, I was having with him. If my 
influence wasn’t curricular, what was it? Gradually, and in an improvisatory way, 
two videos John had given me at different times helped me to conclude that John’s 
pupils were passive and inert. I intuited that if I challenged the passivity of John’s 
pupils in order to bring about curricular change, perhaps I would also be helping 
John to alleviate what I also knew was present: John’s fears. My challenge to John 
was part of the dialectic of care I wanted to show towards him that tried also to be 
sensitive to difference. In the event my challenge proved to be cathartic. John began 
to accept, I believe, that he could now rid himself of some of his fears - even though 
he didn’t accept my assessment of passivity on the part of his pupils.  
 
However, there was another challenge - to myself - though I connected it with John 
also. The challenge was this: “What do I mean by my authentic engagement with my 
God and with John?” It took me a very long time - some four years - before I 
understood and could explain this challenge.  
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In researching my relationship with my God I was surprised to find it was a 
displaced but angry one. I discovered that my anger was really against my church 
and my religious congregation who, in using propositional language to describe God, 
and a liturgy that replaced Him, had masked the ‘real’ God from me, the God of 
relationship (chapter 6). My experience of ‘conflict’ (chapter 5) helped me to 
become properly ‘suspicious’ of any bureaucracy and hierarchy that would attempt 
to so prescribe and predict, order and organise the ‘world’ without reference to those 
on whose behalf they were allegedly doing it. While my present description and 
explanation of my relationship with God may appear to be rational and logical 
(chapter 3) it was not like that for me interiorly. During the period in which I was 
adjusting to my new self-constructed reality about God, I was interiorly full of fears: 
am I judging justly the bureaucracies and hierarchies I have experienced? Am I 
really free to believe in a God of my own understanding?  
 
The freedom born of my struggle to find a God of my own understanding helped me, 
I believe, to author my own life by helping me to slough off at least some of my 
fears of being independent. It was this freedom from fear, based on my new-found 
relationship with God that I claimed to be able to bring to my relationship with John. 
It was the source of my claim to influence him.  
 
My relationship with John wasn’t smooth. It was enduring, but not smooth. It 
withstood John’s complaints that I misunderstood him, that I projected my fears on 
to him, that I occasionally ‘theorised’ him into a ‘weaker’ position vis-a-vis myself, 
that maybe I was contradicting the values of care and freedom in his regard. In the 
end what most concerned me was the extent to which John understood and accepted 
himself. If he had been more open to my challenges I theorised that perhaps his self-
understanding and self-acceptance would have grown more. But who can say that 
with certainty? Not me.  
 
But at the end John was still able to say of me: “you are caring towards others and 
towards me!” I, too, was able to say: “... I am glad that I had John’s help in learning 
about my educational development.” These two sentences distil for me my idea that 
the educative encounter itself is educational; that it enables me to accept, affirm and 
confirm the other in what they are doing. I am accepted, affirmed and confirmed, as 
I try to interweave my values in my educative relationship with John and others in 
the the creation of my own living educational theory as a form of improvisatory self-
realisation.  
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Let me now move to how I connected the personal with the professional in my 
relationship encounter with David in chapter 4. 
 
At my suggestion, David, a teacher researcher, succeeded in implementing to his 
satisfaction the values of democracy and freedom within his various classes. But my 
use of challenging questions, using the action research cycle, didn’t enable him to 
become creative in overcoming his anxieties and fears concerning ‘discipline’. 
However, my fortuitous sharing of my leadership ‘problems’ with him (chapter 5) 
caught his imagination. It brought him to a new realisation about the importance of 
reflection. I didn’t then realise what I was learning: that David was apparently 
influenced by what was personal, emotional and imaginative.  
 
Using my imagination, I had previously constructed a poetic interior monologue. I 
apposed it in this chapter with my educative relationship with David. In the 
monologue I had a searing experience imprinted on my consciousness of 
remembering neglect and hurt when I was young. I mused, thus, on its source: “far 
distant memories of ‘put-down’ experiences” - more recent ones too (chapter 5). I 
found myself listening “with mounting fury,” to Ray who was attacking Sue because 
“I am not hearing you telling us what you’ve learned and how you’ve learned it. I 
feel my time is being wasted.”   
 
I remembered various values I would have liked others to practise towards me - 
trust, respect, uniqueness, assurance, care. Remembering them enabled me to make a 
commitment to helping Sue. I desired to say something “significant” to Sue, 
something “important” that would connect with her and “tell her that she is 
worthwhile.” In terms of questions to help Sue move forward, the best I could 
manage at the time was this: “What question, Sue, would you like us to ask you that 
would enable you to move forward?” It didn’t matter that Sue’s answer didn’t 
answer my question. She offered an answer that obviously answered her own interior 
question: “I am going to write a story.”         
 
In the interior monologue I believe I had connected my imagination with love and 
care, enabling me to see Sue with love. A love that now helped me to want to 
exercise a more gentle dialectic of care and challenge than I believe I had exercised 
in David's regard. Retrospectively, then, I would have wanted to accept David as he 
is, rather than as I wanted him to be. But I finally found myself at ease in declaring 
in Levinas's words (Kearney, 1984) of David, that he was different from me, that 
"two can have a better time than one."    
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I realised that my use of the the linear, rational, logical form of the action research 
cycle with teacher researchers wasn’t always sufficient. Maybe it didn’t always offer 
sufficient freedom to others to be creative in their response to creating their own 
living educational theory. Perhaps it inhibited me, too, in my educative relationship 
with David! My use of my imagination would complement and not necessarily 
replace the action research cycle. Perhaps I could help teacher researchers in the 
future to make more use of their imagination, and other gifts, in their action research 
enquiries.      
 
My action research questions of the kind, “How do I live more fully my values of 
freedom and love?” is not predicated on interpretive research, nor on critical theory 
(see below). I recognise, however, that other educational researchers may wish to 
adopt an interpretive and/or critical stance as their way forward in action research. 
For me, I need more freedom than I believe either the interpretive tradition or critical 
theory could offer me. I needed the freedom to evolve my own living educational 
theory as a form of improvisatory self-realisation. I had a compelling necessity to 
show in my thesis how I embodied the values of freedom and love in my personal 
and professional relationships with John, with David and others. I believe that it was 
only by creating my own living educational theory that I could do that.                 
 
 
The 'Deakin' school of action research 
 
The 'Deakin' school of action research (located at Deakin University, Australia) 
which includes Stephen Kemmis and others, have put forward a model of critical 
educational research (McTaggart et al., 1982; Kemmis, 1983; Carr and Kemmis, 
1986; Kemmis and McTaggart, 1988). Their model rejects the positivist belief in the 
instrumental role of knowledge in problem-solving, arguing that critical enquiry 
enables teacher researchers to search for the meanings that educational action has for 
them and to organise action to bring about a resolution to their classroom concerns. 
It criticises both positivist and interpretive theories on the grounds of passivity, and 
that they are exclusive of human action. 
 
Carr and Kemmis's (1986) definition of action research is useful,  widely used, and 
is as follows: 
 
Action research is a form of self-reflective enquiry undertaken by participants 
in social (including educational) situations in order to improve the rationality 
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and justice of (a) their own social or educational practices, (b) their 
understanding of these practices, and (c) the situations in which the practices 
are carried out. It is most rationally empowering when undertaken by 
participants collaboratively, though it is often undertaken by individuals, and 
sometimes in cooperation with 'outsiders'. In education, action research has 
been employed in school-based curriculum development, professional 
development, school improvement programs, and systems planning and 
policy development. 
 
Carr and Kemmis (1986) view the action research process as a series of reflective 
spirals in which a general plan, action, observation of action, and reflection on action 
is developed and then moved to a new and revised plan with action, observation and 
further reflection. They draw this trading off between retrospective understanding 
and future action directly from Lewin's theory of action research. Carr and Kemmis 
(1986) are concerned with focusing the practitioners’ classroom problems thus: 
What is happening now? In what sense is it problematic? What can I do about it?  
 
The critical theory of the ‘Deakin School’ of educational research prioritises 
teachers' critiques of their own practice rather than rational goal achievement. It 
stresses equipping teacher researchers with discursive, analytical and conceptual 
skills so that they may remain free of the control of positivism and interpretive 
theory. And this is to happen in communities of self-reflective group understanding. 
Thus the ‘Deakin School’ of action research is emancipatory after the 'Frankfurt 
School' of critical theory, built upon the theories of Marx, Freud and particularly 
Habermas. Emancipation for them and for Carr and Kemmis, too, means the 
enabling of teachers and others to take control and direction over their own lives, as 
they use a pre-defined theory, critical theory.  
 
Gibson (1986: 5-6) explains critical theory thus: 
 
Critical theory acknowledges the sense of frustration and powerlessness that 
many feel as they see their personal destinies out of their control, and in the 
hands of (often unknown) others .... Critical theory attempts to reveal those 
factors which prevent groups and individuals taking control of, or even 
influencing, those decisions which crucially affect their lives .... In the 
exploration of the nature and limits of power, authority and freedom, critical 
theory claims to afford insight into how greater degrees of autonomy could 
be available. 
 
This characteristic marks out critical theory's true distinctiveness: its claim 
to be emancipatory. Not only does it provide enlightenment (deeper 
awareness of your true interests); more than that (indeed, because of that), it 
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can set you free. Unlike scientific theory, it claims to provide guidance as to 
what to do.  
 
The term ‘critical’ in critical theory refers to the detecting and unmasking of beliefs 
and practices that limit human freedom, justice and democracy. And the knowledge 
interest involved in critical theory is emancipatory. This emancipatory knowledge 
interest is about the unmasking of ideologies that maintain the status quo. Ideologies 
do so by restricting the access of groups to the means of gaining knowledge and the 
raising of consciousness or awareness about the conditions that oppress or restrict 
them (Scott and Usher, 1996: 22). 
 
The emancipatory knowledge interest of critical theory is not about individual 
freedom as self-assertion, for example, nor is it about helping the individual to feel 
powerful and self-realised. Rather, critical theory’s approach to emancipation is 
about understanding the cause of powerlessness and acting individually and 
collectively to change the conditions that cause it.  
 
Gibson (ibid) issues a warning about critical theory: 
 
There are clearly immense problems attaching to a theory which not only 
argues that it reveals the world more clearly, but also asserts that it can be 
used to change the world, to liberate from inequalities and unfair 
restrictions. 
 
Critical theory, Gibson feels, is not a panacea for all the world's ills. But he feels that 
knowing how it may be applied may provide a rationale, and method, for teachers 
who wish to take more control of their professional and personal lives. However, 
there is at least one other serious problem with critical theory and its self-proclaimed 
commitment to an emancipatory project as a universal value. Gore (1993: 61) 
deploys Foucault’s notion of a ‘regime of truth’ to argue that critical theory has its 
own  
 
power-nexus which, in particular contexts and in particular historical 
moments, will operate in ways that are oppressive and repressive to people 
within and/or outside.  
 
 
The claim of critical theory does not convince me! 
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I am not convinced by the claim of critical theory that "it can reveal the world more 
clearly and that its critical analysis can be used to change that world" (ibid). Is that 
not an utopian-like claim? Isn’t it purporting to persuade me to embrace its theory so 
that various ‘wrongs’ can be righted in my practice? I find it difficult to believe that 
the application of critical theory, even if including emancipatory ideas with which I 
agree, is a panacea for the ills of society, or indeed for ‘ills’ in my practice. If I 
adopted it I believe I would be admitting that I am incapable of using my own 
personal knowledge to deal with my own concerns. In adopting it, I would be saying 
that I want, as Eames (in Whitehead, 1999: 12) put it, to "decide beforehand." In 
adopting a pre-defined theory such as critical theory, I believe I would be 
unnecessarily limiting my own freedom of thought, reflection and action. I would be 
adopting a prescriptive and, perhaps, a predictive approach to my concerns. I would 
perhaps be admitting that there is no reason to think that I could evolve my own 
theory from my own practice, as I believe I did in my thesis each time I tried to 
‘resolve' my concerns in my practice, including emancipatory ones, in order to bring 
about improvement. Polanyi (1958: 327), helpfully, offers me his ideas about 
intellectual freedom which is part of the value of freedom to which I have pledged 
myself, when he says that: 
 
I must understand the world from my own point of view, as a person 
claiming originality and exercising his personal judgment responsibly with 
universal intent.    
 
I’m not sure to what extent I could claim to understand the world from my own point 
of view, could claim originality, could fully exercise my personal judgment, if I 
persuaded myself to suspend my own personal knowledge in favour of the pre-
defined theories of others in order to understand and resolve my concerns in my life 
and work. I have observed that such pre-defined theories don’t offer ostensive 
examples of how they are actually embodied in the lives and actions of those who 
created them.  
 
Such theories of knowledge, as critical theory, are, for me, ‘objective’ or 
‘propositional’. By being ‘objective, or ‘propositional’, I mean that they are more or 
less reified or fixed; they consist of explicitly formulated ideas and statements that 
are ‘out there,’ and are considered to be ‘true’. They are independent of me as a 
‘knower’ (McNiff, 1993: 22-23). I wish to listen respectfully to whatever objective 
or propositional theories of knowledge can tell me, but within a framework of a 
dialectical form of knowledge in which I am creating my own living educational 
theory.  
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In my thesis I have used a dialectical form of knowledge, a knowledge that is based 
on the kind of enquiry that incorporates “the interplay of question and answer”  
(Collingwood in Eames, 1993: 4). Such a process of question and answer is, for me, 
a living and developmental form of knowledge in which I take responsibility for my 
own concerns, ideas and actions. It has the power to transform my practice, or at 
least my understanding of my practice.  
 
In my thesis, then, I was less preoccupied with objective or propositional theories, 
such as critical theory, and more preoccupied with the processes of action research, 
which involved individuals, including myself, in asking in our individual practices 
how we were improving something, however small. I was interested, also, in how 
this improvement was ‘relatable’ to others. I wanted it to "stimulate worthwhile 
thinking" (Bassey, 1995:111) as, for example (in chapter 2), when I showed how 
Marion, Valerie, Rose (and other pupils), and I, myself, managed to alleviate 
“frustration”, “powerlessness” and “unfair restriction” (Gibson, 1986: 5-6) in our 
individual and interrelated practices. I initially experienced “frustration.” (ibid) for 
example, in my attempt to understand my educative relationship with Valerie, but by 
assiduously ‘worrying' my data, I gradually came to an appreciation of it. There was 
Rose, also. She was one of Valerie’s pupils who put her experience of 
“powerlessness” (ibid) thus:  
 
In R.E. class there is no accommodation of different views especially on 
moral issues. 
 
Valerie, at my instigation, encouraged Rose to write about her own concerns. And at 
the end Rose was able to say that:  
 
I think R.E. was a lot more relevant this year .... because we dealt with real 
problems.  
 
I felt that in her life as a pupil, Rose had, with Valerie’s encouragement, overcome a 
particular instance of feeling frustrated and powerless. In order to enable her R.E. 
class to be more ‘relevant’ and to enable pupils to think for themselves, Valerie 
herself decided to consult her pupils on their ‘concerns.’ She, too, was anxious to 
overcome her own feelings of ”frustration” and “powerlessness” (Gibson, 1986: 5-
6). Gradually, as she said, her class moved away from being teacher centred to being 
pupil-centred.   
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Valerie then began, as she said, to  
 
enjoy how articulate and opinionated the class were .... I felt at this point I 
had a relationship with the class.  
 
She was also adamant that  
 
if I believe that education is about offering a person the ability to find 
meaningful life for themselves, well then I had better rethink my approach. 
 
Section two in chapter 2 shows that Valerie did “rethink (her) approach” in a series 
of measures, checking with her pupils as she moved along. On the basis of Valerie's 
arguments, I concluded that she had succeeded in changing the climate for learning 
and the quality of the learning itself in her classroom. I felt that whatever "unfair 
restrictions" (Gibson, 1986: 5-6) once might have existed in her classroom were 
now gone.  
 
It seemed to me that Valerie didn't need to use any pre-defined theories to help her to 
improve her practice. She didn't, therefore, need to "decide beforehand" (Eames in 
Whitehead, 1999: 12). Rather, she embodied her values in her practice in order to 
help her theorise and make her decisions based on those values. Rather than use 
propositional or objective theory say, critical theory, to help her to embody her 
values in her practice, she used the dialectical logic of question and answer. This 
helped her, I believe, to be more open towards her students and led to “changed 
understanding” (ibid) on her part and on the part of her students. 
 
 
I offer an alternative way of thinking and acting   
 
Listening again to the emancipatory ideas of Carr and Kemmis, as derived from 
critical theory (1986), I want to offer an alternative way of thinking and acting. But, 
first, let me listen again to Carr and Kemmis (p.198) as they explain their 
emancipatory theory:  
 
Action research not only creates conditions under which practitioners can 
identify aspects of institutional life which frustrate rational change; it also 
offers a theoretical account of why these constraints on rational change 
should be overcome, by offering and enacting an emancipatory theory in the 
form of the theory of how the constraints of ideology can be overcome.  
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When I originally read the emancipatory vision of Carr and Kemmis I felt excited 
and wished to rush into identifying those "aspects of institutional life which frustrate 
rational change." I came to know, however, from my own experience in my enquiry 
(chapter 5), that each instance of institutional life is different from another instance, 
each is populated with different people, all of whom are different from each other.  
 
In my action research enquiry each of the people I worked with was an individual 
different from any other individual. And because of my awareness of the vast 
differences between the people I encountered in power positions (chapter 5), and 
otherwise too, I came to believe that using an undifferentiated pre-defined theory, 
say, critical theory, or pre-defined leadership theories, for example, in order to 
resolve the power relations conflicts I experienced, would not work for me.  
 
I didn’t want or need, prior to my own action research reflection and action, a 
theoretical critique, such as an “exploration of the nature and limits of power, 
authority and freedom” (Gibson, 1986: 5-6). Critical theory claims to offer such a 
critique in order to help me to gain “insight into how greater degrees of autonomy 
could be available” (ibid). I want and need to be personally responsible for valuing 
my own personal freedom and personal integrity. My conscience constantly pleads 
with me to do so, as I try to understand the world from my own point of view, use 
my own originality, exercise my own personal judgment (Polanyi, 1958: 327) and 
evolve my own theory from my own practice, as a form of improvisatory self-
realisation. By so doing, I am offering my own alternative to the emancipatory ideas 
of critical theory.           
 
As part of my effort to evolve my own theory from my practice, my thesis showed 
me working as an individual, identifying individual items of my practice which 
needed changing and improving. I did so by imagining ways forward, devising 
action plans, acting, evaluating and modifying my action plans (Whitehead, 1993). 
For example, in dealing with my leadership ‘conflict’ (chapter 5), I decided that I 
would neither pre-define or allow others to pre-define how I should act as leader of 
the action research project located at the college of education where I then worked 
(1990-1995). I took up a stance of nonconformity towards the expectations of others. 
Over time in regard to my leadership, I found I could “constantly enact it,” 
constantly “accomplish it” (Sinclair, 1998). I did so by experimenting in an 
improvisatory way “with self-revelation, with resistance, with trying to build new 
paths” (Sinclair, 1998).  
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A part of my effort “to build new paths” (ibid) consisted, on the one hand, of 
dealing with the ‘conflict’ I experienced, but on the other, of working to connect the 
personal with the professional in my explanation of my educative relationships with 
teachers (chapters 2, 3 and 4). I exercised my “ethic of responsibility” towards these 
teachers as I worked at enabling them to improve what they were doing at the same 
time as I was experiencing my leadership ‘conflict’ (chapter 5). 
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, this ‘conflict’ I showed how my leadership came into 
being in my words and actions as I exercised my ethic of responsibility towards 
others (Abstract). My experience of the denial of my value of freedom as action 
research project leader (chapter 5) helped me to to answer a radical call to myself of 
personal freedom, especially freedom from restraint and fear in order to realise my 
‘true’ self. The radical call to myself of personal freedom helped me to work towards 
exercising a care towards others, born of love, which I explained thus in section one, 
chapter 2: 
 
My care is a legitimate anxiety I hold about ensuring that the person I am 
with in the educative relationship is as free from fears as is humanly 
possible.    
 
I believe I succeeded in affecting some change and improvement in my 
understanding of a negative aspect of institutional life as I experienced it (chapter 5). 
The change and improvement I experienced as an individual wasn’t external. I didn’t 
suddenly experience “rational change” (Carr and Kemmis, 1986: 198) in the sense 
that the attitude of the principal of the college towards me changed from one of 
disregard to one of acceptance and understanding. No, I found I had to use my 
personal knowledge by working internally on myself. I felt I had to preserve my 
sense of my identity and my sense of self-worth. But, simultaneously, I was 
confident that I had established  good quality educative relationships with the 
teachers I was supporting, as they were improving what they were doing. My efforts 
to accept, affirm and confirm them not only helped them more confidently to 
improve what they were doing, but I also received acceptance, affirmation and 
confirmation from them, in turn. The teachers and I, therefore, reciprocally exercised 
an “ethic of responsibility” towards each other, as I simultaneously showed how my 
leadership came into being in my words and actions (Abstract knowledge claim). 
 
Still (1993), quoted by Marshall (1995: 320), suggests that the preoccupation of 
women managers with exploring issues of identity and self is an indulgence. Still’s 
(1993) advice to women, according to Marshall (ibid), is to focus instead, “on 
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achievement, on gaining power in current organizational structures and on 
identifying common agendas for change.” In spite of Still’s (ibid) exhortative 
prescriptions, however, I don’t hear how women managers are to bring about the 
changes that Still suggests. Like Marshall’s (p. 321) women manager researchers, 
however, I, too, have “wanted to feel more authentic and less defined by other 
people.” I needed to explore issues to do with my identity and integrity, and to do 
with not allowing others to define me. And so I used my reflection and writing about 
my action research enquiry to help me create a strong sense of my “self” that I 
“could validate internally, and which could then provide firm, alive, bases for 
knowing, and acting” (ibid, p. 321).  
 
Marshall (1995: 326) suggests that her women manager researchers should choose 
“sufficient truths to live by, realizing that things will unravel, managing to avoid 
undue anxiety and adopting an ever-enquiring attitude to encounter change as it 
occurs” (ibid). Following Marshall (ibid), I believe that throughout my action 
research enquiry, I have acquired “sufficient truths to live by ...,” as I both embodied 
and constructed my values of freedom and love, in my intrapersonal dialogue and in 
my educative relationship with others, as a form of improvisatory self-realisation. 
 
There is a need, according to Marshall (ibid), to hold “multiple perspectives,” rather 
than “one dominant, ‘right’ form” because the world around me offers “discordant 
expectations.” There is a need, she says, for people to be “aware of the personal, 
social and power-political processes through which frames are created, maintained 
and resisted.” As for myself, I acquired my “multiple perspectives” (ibid) within, 
and in terms of, each of my studies of singularity as I analysed my  experience of the 
negation of my values in my practice. I don’t think I have sought to transfer 
automatically the “multiple perspectives” that I may have acquired in one situation 
with one person, to another person in another situation. I have been unable do so 
because I freely committed myself in one of my claims to educational knowledge to 
“show .... a dialectic of both care and challenge that is sensitive to difference ....” 
(Abstract). I have to honour “difference” within and between people. I would be 
unable to do that if I held what Marshall (ibid) calls “one dominant, ‘right’ form.”   
 
It is not so much the situations in themselves per se that are important to me, as the 
people who are to be found in those situations that are important. In each instance, 
and with each person I meet, I have to unravel the “multiple perspectives” I have 
gathered and discriminate between them in terms of who others are and in terms of 
who I am. I believe that such a view is implied, and then shown, in my commitment 
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in encounters with others to accept, affirm and confirm them so that they may more 
easily improve what they are doing (Introduction). I don’t always succeed, of course, 
in showing “a dialectic of care and challenge that is sensitive to difference ....” 
(Abstract) because I am also “a living contradiction” (Whitehead, 1993): I hold 
values and I deny them in my practice (chapter 5).     
 
                 
Criticism of the “individual focus” of action research enquiries 
 
I now want to consider Noffke’s (1997: 329) reference to individually oriented 
action research and that the “individual focus” of action research enquiries such as 
mine, doesn’t sufficiently “address the social basis of personal belief systems.” She 
says that:  
 
As vital as such a process of self-awareness is to identifying the 
contradictions between one's espoused theories and one's practices, perhaps 
because of its focus on individual learning, it only begins to address the 
social basis of personal belief systems.      
 
Noffke (1991; 1997) believes that such a process of self-awareness, while it can help 
to bring about "collective agency" (McNiff, 1988),  built on the ideas of a society "as 
a collection of autonomous individuals," it is not capable of addressing social issues 
in terms of the interconnections between personal identity and power and privilege 
in society. Let me attempt to 'answer' Noffke's concerns, as I consider the direction 
of my own research.       
 
Noffke's argument doesn't convince me that "autonomous individuals" such as I 
aspire to being, are incapable of bringing about social change. I believe I will not 
necessarily understand social situations very well unless I first learn to be an 
autonomous individual. I believe that it was only because I showed myself in my 
thesis to be growing autonomously in my embodiment of my values in my educative 
relationships with teachers, that I was able to be societally useful to them. I believe I 
succeeded in doing so not so much at the 'macro' level, but at the 'micro level' of 
helping them with their action research enquiries in their schools.  
 
These teachers, in turn, are now able to bring about change and improvement 
incrementally at their own micro level in the classroom.  Perhaps by engaging in 
dialectical debate, maintaining openness to answering questions and challenges set 
by themselves and others, they will be able to change and improve concerns at the 
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macro level of the whole school as well. I believe, too, that their willingness to 
disturb and be disturbed, to question and challenge need not be adversarial, 
combative or hostile (Marshall, 1995: 331; chapters 2 to 6).  
 
I am also aware, however, that Dadds (ibid) hypothesises that “Research which 
arose from the interests of the individual, rather than the group  would .... be less 
likely  to serve the needs of the school” in “practical developments” (Dadds, 1995: 
4) beyond the classroom. While respecting Dadds’ hypothesis, I am committed to 
individually oriented action research. I am committed to it because of its potential 
for raising the morale and confidence of individuals, including myself, as we pursue 
improvements in our individual practices (chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6). I cannot believe 
that when self-confident individuals come together in order to work at serving “the 
needs of the classroom“ beyond the classroom, they won’t succeed in doing so, but I 
agree that it remains to be shown beyond hypothesis at least in my case. In the 
meantime, I am willing to learn from Dadds and others who, embodying their values 
in their improvement of practice, have brought about “collegial involvement and 
ownership” (ibid) of action research concerns, and succeeded in bringing about 
change and improvement at the macro level of the school.                                                       
 
Noffke (1997: 334) lauds "recent research" that is articulating "the historical roots 
of both individual and collective belief systems that form a basis from which 
personal awareness emerges." In my research I do not wish, as in social history, to 
interpret the past as a base from which to begin researching the present social world 
(Hitchcock and Hughes, 1989: 28). My form of research is individually oriented 
dialectical action research, which has helped me to realise that the derivation of my 
belief system is not of ultimate importance to me. And while not denying the 
"historical roots" of my belief system, I strongly believe that as I grow and develop, 
helped by continuous reflective enquiry, so do my beliefs and values. What is 
important to me is to continuously embody my values in my life so that I can 
continue to improve what I am doing with others in the present and future.     
 
If by "historical roots," Noffke means a system external to myself from which I have 
accepted an unshakeable and unchangeable belief system, I reject that notion. I know 
that my beliefs and my values achieved clarity in my thesis and were capable of 
changing, not through an acceptance of pre-defined beliefs and theories for analytic 
purposes, but through my embodiment of my values in my educative relationships 
with others. It was in my practice of my educative relationships with others that I 
found ostensive meanings that clarified how I held my values, and the notion of 
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'being a living contradiction' (Whitehead,1993) was fundamental to those ostensive 
meanings. 
 
 
My theory is a form of improvisatory self-realisation          
 
Regarding critical theory (Carr and Kemmis’s, 1986) and, indeed, other ‘outsider’ 
theories, let me say that they are perhaps too prescriptive and predictive for me: my 
research is neither prescriptive not predictive in intent or practice. It does not offer a 
panacea for great social ills or evils. It is more like the research Seidman (1991: 136) 
proposes when he argues "that we be satisfied with local, pragmatic rationales for 
our .... approaches." In accepting a ‘local’, a ‘pragmatic’ and personal rationale for 
my study of singularity, which is my thesis, I base it on Winter’s idea (1997; 1998) 
that: 
 
theory in action research is a form of improvisatory self-realisation, where 
theoretical resources are not pre-defined in advance, but are drawn in by the 
process of the enquiry.   
 
I included the propositional form of discourse - Winter’s 'theoretical resources' - 
within the dialectical knowledge I used in my thesis. The dialectical knowledge I 
used is a form of knowledge based on "the interplay of question and answer" 
(Collingwood [1924] in Eames 1993: 4). The use of this form of knowledge is a 
process that, for me, is living and developmental. It includes both intrapersonal and 
interpersonal dialogues in a form of research that is "systematic, critical and self-
critical" (Bassey, 1995: 7). It is a form of research that doesn't "predict probabilities, 
but .... (can) be related to other situations." This form of improvisatory research 
enabled me to create my own descriptions and explanations for my own self-
realisation, my own educational development. My descriptions and explanations 
offered me an opportunity to evaluate my past practice with an intention to create an 
improvement which was then not in existence (Whitehead in Lomax, 1999: 14), as I 
attempted in my research to answer questions of the kind, "How do I improve what I 
am doing?" and "How do I live out my values in my practice?"  
 
Regarding pre-defined rules, theories or ideologies, I want to use a North-American 
slang expression “dumbing down,” changing its meaning ever so slightly. While it 
means “reducing or adapting to a lower level of understanding” (Oxford Concise 
English Dictionary, 1995:420), I’m not advocating that I understand less or be 
involved in "a lower level of understanding." No, it’s just that I wish to move from 
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beautiful, but high-flown rhetoric - perhaps such as in critical theory, in the 
interpretive tradition and in other theories, too - based perhaps on abstractions 
derived from generalisations, which include prescription. Rather, I wish to move to 
my explanation of my research which is small-scale, dealing with myself and with 
other individuals, all of whom were researching their own individual practices as we 
enabled local, worthwhile change and improvement to take place, however small.   
 
In exploring the theory practice relationship, Dadds says that: “Theory has no 
autonomous existence from the theory user ....” (1991); “Theory exists only within 
people ....”; and “Theory alone does not change the world. People do” (Dadds, 
1993a: 231). So, if I understand Dadds correctly, theory is inextricably interwoven 
with the theory user, is within me as researcher. And it is I, and not theory so much 
that changes the world - or at least a concern I may have that needs to be worked on. 
I ask, however, couldn’t theory and my “I”, who does the improving and changing, 
be inextricably linked in that my “I” can do the creating of theory? I believe that is 
what I do when I connect the personal with the professional in my encounters with 
teachers - I create my own living educational theory.  
 
I embrace Dadds’ (1993a: 231) reference to action research being about “Warm 
hearts, commitment, altruistic tendencies, and the ability to persuade ...,”  I like to 
think of this phrase as being part of my two values of freedom and love that I try to 
embody in my life and actions with teachers and others. In trying to embody these 
values and experiencing their negation, I am able to describe and explain my living 
educational theory. I wonder a little, though, about the meaning of the ending of 
Dadds’ sentence that begins with “warm hearts ....” and ends with “may be as 
equally important as clear ideas ....” I thinks Dadds could continue to use her phrase 
”clear ideas,” but could perhaps consider it as being synonymous with living theory 
evolving from practice as she couples it also with “Warm hearts ....”          
 
   
Thinking and feeling go together 
 
Let me now focus on Dadds' (1993a: 230) view that “aspects of the literature” 
present action research “as a personally problem-free experience” in which “There 
are action research steps to be followed .... in some logical progression that will 
lead to cognitive enlightenment, and recognition of necessary change” (Kemmis and 
McTaggart, 1988 and Elliott, 1981). Action research is therefore “systematic, linear, 
cerebral and behaviouristic.” For Dadds, supporters and teacher-researchers, in 
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exploring their own values as practitioners, are emotionally committed to improving 
their respective practices. And so, feelings are inextricably interwoven in the action 
research process. Dadds (1993: 229) explains thus:  
 
it is a misconceived enterprise to try and separate teachers' thinking in action 
research from their feelings, beliefs, attitudes, their being and their sense of 
self. 
 
Evans (1995: internet) is also concerned about the lack of reference in the action 
research literature to “action researchers’ feelings about themselves, each other, and 
the situation .....” She puts her concern thus: 
 
In looking back over the early writings about action research, I am puzzled 
as to why it is seen in terms of people thinking, doing, participating in social 
contexts, and becoming critical, without even a passing reference to the 
affective domain?   
 
Evans (ibid) wonders if, in the move towards Carr and Kemmis’s (1986) ideas of 
‘rationality’ and ‘justice,’ action researchers' feelings are taken for granted, or not 
considered to be important? Carr and Kemmis (1986: 44), in concluding a section of 
their book on teachers' knowledge, emphasise reflexivity, knowing by doing, 
thinking critically, and being aware of the historical location and social context of 
educational acts. But in advising teachers to problematise their practice, they do so 
from a cognitive perspective and ignore the part played in that practice by emotions.  
 
It seems, then, as if earlier action research schemes and models  excluded feelings, 
and not only feelings, but also dilemmas, ambiguities, and experiences of “the 
personal” (Evans, 1995: internet). Following Lomax and Parker (1995), Evans 
(1995: internet) calls for more relational forms of representation in accounts of 
action research enquiries. Indeed, Evans (ibid) very strongly declares that: 
 
I would .... like to challenge those .... approaches which hold feeling and 
emotion to be less important than a cognitive approach to knowing. 
 
Evans (1995: internet) support Dadds’ (1995b) notion that action research needs to 
be passionate enquiry. But what is the nature of the ‘passionate enquiry’ that Dadds 
(1995b: 7) speaks about? Dadds (ibid) says: 
 
I have .... come to understand that developing theory and practice through 
action research is not simply a matter for the intellect. There are many forces 
embedded within our histories and emotional lives that are brought to bear. 
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Vicki's action research was a form of passionate enquiry. It was informed as 
much by her past as her present; as much by her feelings as her thoughts. 
  
Elliott (1993: 11), commenting on Dadds’ notion of “passionate enquiry” in her 
chapter in his book (chapter 16: 229-242), has this to say: 
 
The chapter challenges the assumption which underpins the traditional 
rationalist paradigm of educational research, which assumes that 
detachment from ‘the passions’ of the self (biases) is a condition for 
developing insight and understanding. Dadds’ case study .... constitutes a 
powerful argument for reconstructing educational research as a form of 
passionate enquiry, in which cognition is inextricably bound up with the 
quest for self-realization, and none the worst for being so ‘biased’.  
 
Marshall (in Reason and Rowan, 1981: 399) seems to me to celebrate ‘bias’ and, like 
Dadds, it may even, for her, be a part of ‘the passions’ of the self when she says that 
“My bias is something I appreciate, it’s part of me as a researcher.” Furthermore, 
she says that: 
 
And while it is important for me and for others to recognize my bias, it really 
is what I can give as a researcher, it is my contribution, and it’s coherent 
and it’s felt and it has all these other qualities which make me value it more 
than a detached attempt to be objective.  
 
But Marshall (ibid) startles me, too, with her reminder that there’s a “dark side to 
this, the feeling that I’ve made it all up”, and she wonders “how can I justify all 
this?” As for myself, my “biases,” my “passions of the self” are invested in how I 
construct my own theory from my practice. It is a practice that I base on my 
embodiment of my values in my practice as I relate to myself intrapersonally and 
with others interpersonally. I realise that in holding values, I negate or contradict 
them and need, therefore, to improve my practice of the values. It’s in the admission 
of contradiction (and it being pointed out to me, too, as with Zoe in chapter 2) and in 
my reflexive and retrospective search for improvement, that I believe that I can 
“justify all this” (can justify my explanation of my evidence), can overcome my 
feeling “that I’ve made it all up.”     
 
And as with Dadd’s enquiry, and Elliott’s depiction of it, my own action research 
enquiry about my creation of my own living educational theory obviously, too, 
includes feelings as well as thoughts. I believe that my thesis offers evidence to 
support Dadds' (p. 241) view that: 
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if we cannot understand the complexities of what it feels like to be a teacher 
action researcher, we are disabled from providing the most supportive 
learning climate and the most supportive research relationship that we can 
offer.    
  
Perhaps I could also raise what Dadds (1993a: 231) calls “an additional and 
complementary,” rather than a “competing” point when I say that my feelings are, 
for me, at the service of my educative relationships with others in which I tried to 
embody my values, particularly those of freedom and love. As I said in chapter 7: 
“At the heart of my research and thesis is the notion of ‘valuing.’” And valuing is to 
do with “giving oneself worth and demanding recognition for it” (Fukuyama (1992: 
189). Every human being needs a “sense of self-worth,” declares Fukuyama (1992: 
181). A part of my struggle in my thesis has been to represent to the best of my 
ability, through my experiences, what is seared in my consciousness regarding the 
need to both possess self-worth and to help others to acquire or strengthen it within 
themselves in their personal and professional lives. I have also been struggling to 
become more and more consciously aware that it is not superiority I sought for 
myself or others, but rather recognition on a basis of equality. 
 
Regarding my embodiment of my own values of freedom and love in my practice, I 
know I couldn’t have done so successfully without experiencing emotion. Following 
Goleman (1996: xii), I know that emotion has helped me to show concern for myself 
and for others as persons, which Goleman (ibid) calls ‘emotional intelligence’. It is 
the kind of intelligence that, in my action research, filled me with zeal and 
persistence and gave me the ability to motivate myself in my encounters with others. 
Feelings are the moral agents that motivated me in my practice of my values in my 
educative relationships with others, and helped me to come to understand my thesis 
question, “How do I come to know my spirituality, as I create my own living 
educational theory?”  
 
 
‘Living educational theory’ 
 
Regarding my use of the notion of ‘living educational theory’, I have of course, been 
hugely influenced by Whitehead. He developed the idea of living educational theory, 
which he offers as the basis of an epistemology of practice (Whitehead, 1993: 67-
77). His idea is an invitation to us to consider ourselves as living contradictions 
where we espouse educational values that are not fully realised in our educational 
practices. It was in constantly searching for the means by which a person could 
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reflect these values in their practice, and in the continuing improvisatory 
experimentation that it offered them, that gave Whitehead’s notion of action research 
its particular emphasis on personal renewal as a means of promoting a good social 
order (McNiff, Whitehead, and Laidlaw, 1992). Whitehead recognised the centrality 
of the ‘I’ of the researcher in relation to practice, to other participants, and to the 
context of the research. Lomax (1998: 10) calls Whitehead’s view of action research 
“a new discipline of educational enquiry” and says it is based on his three 
arguments as follows: 
 
The first is that in questions of the kind, “How do I improve my practice?”, 
“I” exists as a living contradiction in holding values and experiencing their 
denial at the same time as asking the question. The second is that “I” as a 
living contradiction is motivated to improve what he or she is doing .... The 
third is that the descriptions and explanations for their own learning which 
individuals create, constitute their own living educational theories.     
 
In chapter 7, I more fully answered my thesis question about how I came to create 
my own living educational theory as a form of “improvisatory self-realisation” 
(Winter, 1997; 1998). I explained that it was a theory that was based on and grew 
from my disciplined descriptions and explanations of my educative relationships 
with others. These explanations contained both ‘intra’ and ‘inter’-personal dialogues. 
The ‘intra’-personal dialogues helped me to represent my meanings to myself and 
the ‘inter’-personal dialogues helped me to represent my meanings to others. 
 
My writing of my thesis has been part of my reflective process and, as such, it has 
had the power to transform my thinking, rather than just being an end product of my 
action research enquiry practice. My writing of my thesis offered me the opportunity 
to theorise about what I have done and to come to some tentative conclusions about 
it.  
 
I believe that my tentative conclusions showed that I was not examining the practice 
of others, as a ‘spectator’ would do who was outside of my practice. Rather, my 
tentative conclusions showed how I connected the personal with the professional as 
a ‘participant’ in my explanation of my educative relationships with others. I 
attempted - and often succeeded - in accepting, affirming and confirming others so 
that they confidently answered questions to do with improving what they were 
doing, thus enabling them to live out more fully their values in their respective 
practices.  
 
 
